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The Two Carnegie Reports: From the
Balkan Expedition of 1913 to the
Albanian Trip of 1921
A Comparative Approach
Nadine Akhund
1 From the Balkan Wars to the end of World War One, international relations changed
thoroughly. This shift in depth was the final phase of an evolution that started between
the  Crimean  War  and  the  Berlin  Congress  of  1878.  At  the  same  time,  a  broader
movement was emerging: the Peace Movement, whose premise was that war was not
going to disappear but the rules of war should be codified through international law.
The Peace movement also addressed new concepts such as  the issues pertaining to
civilians  in  wartime.  As  a  corollary,  prevention  of  conflict,  collective  intervention
might contribute to defuse crises and dissipate tensions. These concepts slowly made
their way to the highest foreign offices of the European Great Powers and in the USA
through conferences, several of them organized at the Russian initiative1.  Then, the
well-known two Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907 constituted the first try to provide
institutions to the Peace Movement as the Great Powers gathered among more than 20
other states to discuss world issues2.
2 This evolution in foreign affairs was particularly noticeable in the Balkans during the
decline of the Ottoman Empire. Along the 19th century, the region can be viewed as a
laboratory of political experiences ranging from classic military intervention, invasions
(the Ottoman point of view), or wars of liberation for the Balkan states, to a range of
intermediary  political  tryout  such  as  the  occupation  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina  or  the
complex autonomous status of Bulgaria. Of these, international intervention is to be
highlight, as it would have a major impact on foreign international policy during the
20th. In the Ottoman Empire, international intervention derived from the Great Powers’
involvement which took various forms, such as military, Austrian or Russian armies, or
protection  of  the  Christian  orthodox  minorities  and  led  around  1878  to  the
establishment of zones of influences, the Great Powers division of the Balkans among
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themselves,  following  their  rising  recent  economic  interests3.  Around  1900,
international  intervention  ceased  to  be  based  on  marching  armies  and  instead
collective  diplomacy  emerged  as  a  response  to  the  crises  linked  to  the  rise  of
nationalism  and  the  decline  of  the  central  power  in  Istanbul.  The  first  organized
international interventions took place in Crete 1899 and in Macedonia in 19044.
3 What could be the link between the Peace Movement, the evolution in foreign affairs
and the well-known philanthropist Andrew Carnegie (1835-1919) ? Carnegie, like others
successful entrepreneurs of the time, supported the Peace Movement as peace implied
economic  prosperity  and  progress  for  the  humankind;  and  war  meant  regression5.
Founded in 1910, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) had three
objectives:  to  promote  international  understanding,  to  study  the  effects  of  war  on
civilians, and to support international law. Carnegie surrounded himself with leaders
belonging to the new professional class, lawyers, academics and diplomats. They were
the products of urbanization and industrialization that accelerated since the end of the
US  Civil  War.  Mostly  Protestant,  Republican  and  conservative,  they  believed  that
education could shape public opinion. The CEIP was run by a board of trustees that
usually met twice a year to discuss budget and programs among the three divisions of
international  law,  inter-course and education and economics and history6.  Carnegie
appointed individuals he knew through business, friends he trusted on a personal level.
For the period under study, the main personalities were Elihu Root (1845-1937),  his
lawyer, the first president of the CEIP until 1925, Nicholas Murray Butler (1862-1947), a
key personality, president of Columbia University from 1901 to 1945 and later second
president of the CEIP, James Brown Scott (1866-1943), international lawyer and head of
the  division  of  International  Law,  James  Shotwell  (1874-1965),  History  Professor  at
Columbia University and head of the division of Economics and History. The CEIP was
also  a  trans-Atlantic  and transnational  network  with  strong connections  in  Europe
thanks to US diplomats such as Andrew White (1832-1918),  a former ambassador in
Germany and Russia, head of the US delegation at the Hague Conference of 1899, and
Charlemagne Tower Jr. (1848-1923), also former ambassador in Germany, Russia and
Austria-Hungary.  In  Europe,  a  close  network  of  academics  and  diplomats  were
members of the CEIP European bureau, created in Paris in 1912, under the direction of
another key player, Paul d’Estournelles de Constant (1852-1924), a French diplomat and
a personal friend of Nicholas Butler.
4 How was the US-based CEIP drawn into the explosive situation in the Balkans at the
time of the final chapter of the Eastern Question ? The Carnegie Endowment intervened
in the Balkans in 1913 and again in 1921. Because the Endowment sent an international
commission to have an impact on international policy, this paper describes how the
two Carnegie reports constituted an international intervention of a new kind, as it was
not mandated by any of the Great Powers. By sending delegates in the Balkans, the
CEIP, as a new comer, a non-governmental organization was present at the dawn of a
new type of international relations after 1918.
 
I. Narrative of the two reports of 1913 and 1921
5 The explosive situation in the Balkans was the perfect opportunity for the Carnegie
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A. The Balkan Expedition of 1913
6 On July 21, 1913, Nicholas Butler wrote to his longtime friend Paul d’Estournelles de
Constant :  « The  time  has  come  to  send  a  notable  commission,  without  a  day
unnecessary delay, to the Balkan States in order that they might see for themselves just
what the conditions are and make a report to the Trustees of the Carnegie Endowment
(…) which might be sent broad-cast all over the world »7. Further in his letter, Butler
defined the following objectives of the future commission: to establish the truth about
the massacres and atrocities ;  to  look for those responsible for  the outbreak of  the
wars ;  to define the moral and economic losses of the war and the lessons for “the
civilized people” ; and finally to conduct an impartial study of the facts observed in the
field. The essential role of Nicholas Butler as sole decision maker is to be underlined.
Butler informed Elihu Root on July 19 and then wrote to d’Estournelles de Constant
about his decision. On July 17 and 18, 1913, the New York Times published two long
articles on the King of Greece’s graphic reports of massacres committed by Bulgarian
troops  against  civilians.  In  his  letter  to  d’Estournelles  de  Constant,  Butler  quoted
extensively  the two articles8.  Andrew Carnegie  himself  was not  consulted.  While  in
Scotland,  he  learned  about  the commission  few  weeks  later  through  a  British
newspaper  and he wrote :  « I  confess  that  I  got  a  shock »,  asking d’Estournelles  de
Constant to provide information about it9. In fact, Carnegie did not approve the concept
entirely, commenting that an inquiry would antagonize further the conflict.
7 The Balkan expedition took place at the end of the Second Balkan war. The Balkan wars
were short, less than a year long (October 1912-August 1913), extremely bloody and set
a  precedent  in  the  new  century  for  the  massive  atrocities  on  every  single  side10.
Moreover, the wars ended five centuries of Ottoman rule in Europe. What were the
reasons for the Carnegie Endowment to intervene and to set up an inquiry in a Balkan
regional conflict ? From the outset, the “Carnegie men” were concerned with the
treatment of civilians in warfare. In 1912-13, the civilians represented a crucial stake as
each Balkan state was driven by the concept of one nation within one state. The wars
were  extensively  reported  in  the  European  and  in  US  presses.  A  flurry  of  articles
emphasized  the  magnitude  of  atrocities  raising  polemics  about  the  belligerent’s
responsibilities. As Butler wrote, the press speculated on why the Endowment was not
denouncing the massacres.
8 From Butler’s letters until mid-August, when the commission was formed, few elements
revealed his visionary sense of modernity providing the structure of the future report.
The commission should be an international one. While Butler suggested and exchanged
names  with  d’Estournelles  de  Constant,  he  insisted  on  including  a  German and  an
Austrian.  In  addition  to  American,  Britons,  and  French,  others  nationalities  were
considered : Italian although briefly along with Argentinean, Hungarian but discarded,
and Russian retained11.  No Scandinavians were mentioned where they were already
part  of police  forces  in  Crete  and  Macedonia  (military  from  Sweden,  Norwegian,
Belgium).  Butler  insisted  on  choosing  prominent  people,  as  he  wanted  as  much
publicity as possible and to use the press on a wide scale to advertise one of the main
the CEIP objective, to denounce the horrors of the wars. « It will be of vital importance
to use all possible publicity for this commission and its work12».According to Butler,
public  opinion  was  regarded  as  a  potential  actor  that  needed  to  be  informed  and
educated to prevent further conflicts. In fact, the education of the public was one of the
Endowment’s major objectives13. Finally, the timing was also important. Butler wanted
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the commission to almost witness the massacres in order to be in better position to
denounce them. He insisted on an almost immediate departure : three weeks on the
ground  and  a  report  ready  by  September  1913.However,  the  constitution  of  the
commission took much longer than Butler had expected. As primarily a network in
essence, the CEIP relied on personal link. The members of the commission were chosen
on  the  basis  of  their  friendship  with  either  Butler  or  d’Estournelles  de  Constant.
Eventually,  the commission grew larger and it was decided to split  it,  with a group
staying  in  Paris  and  the  other  one  going  to  the  Balkans14.  Three  members  were
university professors,  three other representatives of their parliament and two were
journalists.  The  commission  included  eight  members  under  the  presidency  of
d’Estournelles  de Constant :  Paul  Miliukov,  historian and member of  the Duma,  the
British  journalist  Henry  Brailsford,  Francis  Hirst,  editor  of  The  Economist, and  the
American law professor Samuel Dutton15. Justin Godard, a French deputy of Lyon, was
appointed secretary to the commission. Finally, Law Professor Walter Schücking from
Marburg and Professor Joseph Redlich from Vienna joined the commission. Most of the
members already knew each other ; Redlich was a friend of Hirst16.
9 The  trip  lasted  from  August  20  to  September  28.  The  members  traveled  through
Vienna, to Belgrade, Salonika, Athens, Constantinople, Sofia, and back to Paris. It was a
challenging time for such an expedition, as the Treaty of Bucharest ending the wars,
had  just  been signed on  August  10.  Summarizing  the  spirit  of  the  inquiry,  Samuel
Dutton wrote : « the opportunity of gathering materials for new and most impressive
propaganda  against  war  is  unique »17.  Due  to  various  issues  and  to  great
disappointment of Butler, the commission was reduced to four members on the ground
after reaching Belgrade.  Hirst  had declined to travel  for family reasons.  At the last
minute,  Redlich  was  not  authorized  by  his  government  to  travel  and  Schücking,
because of German authorities’ reluctance, joined later. Upon his arrival in Serbia, he
was  told  that  the  trip  had  been  cancelled  and  he  went  back  to  Germany.  The
interference  of  the  German  and  Austrian  governments  surprised  Butler,  for  whom
universities,  as  private  institutions,  and  their  faculty  were  expected  to  remain
independent from government influence18.  However,  later the three men were fully
involved in the writing of the report. Obviously, time for preparation had been short,
the Ottoman and Balkans authorities were notified late, the commission was stopped
and  delayed  several  times.  Paul  Miliukov  was  stopped  in  Belgrade  while  Henry
Brailsford had his own administrative troubles in Greece. However, they approached
their assignment as fieldwork, and despite the fact that only Brailsford and Miliukov
understood  some  Slavic  languages,  they  sought  to  collect  evidence  for  their
investigation and conducted extensive interviews on all  sides,  gathered information
and  evidence  of  tortures  from  civilian  witnesses  and  victims,  inspected  destroyed
villages, religious sites (churches, mosques) and mass graves19.  Upon their arrival in
Sofia in September 1913 Professor Dutton wrote : « What an experience : I sometimes
feel as though I had been standing on the brink of Hell »20.
10 Upon their return, the Balkan commission held several meetings in Paris and it was
decided that Miliukov would write four chapters, Brailsford, Godart and Dutton one
chapter each21. Unfortunately, the publication was delayed by more than six months,
essentially because Paul Miliukov was unable to finish his chapters before April 1914 to
the great exasperation of Butler who insisted on the « psychological moment, both here
and abroad » not to be missed22. The writing process added to the delay, Miliukov wrote
in French as well as Godard while Hirst and Brailsford supervised the translation in
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English. Then, the finished work was sent to the US for correction and transliteration of
Slavic names while the maps and photos were printed in the US and sent to France for
the  French  edition.  Butler  insisted  on  having  the  French  and  in  English  versions
released on the same day. A German translation had been planned but did not occur
because  of  the  delays23.  Finally  in  May,  a  press  release  was  sent  to  about  1 250
newspapers advertising the report24. Most of the volumes were sent upon request, as it
was a non profit-driven operation. The reactions and critics in the press were mixed,
the  Balkans  government’s  protests  were  strong,  but  all  of  them  were  rapidly
overshadowed  by  the  outbreak  of  the  war.Butler’s  fears  turned  to  be  right,  the
momentum was partly missed. However, the Carnegie report was exceptional for his
time. Because the report focused almost exclusively upon the conditions of civilians
during the Balkans wars,  it  advocated,  perhaps idealistically,  that  international  law
might prevent or limit atrocities in the future. By choosing to advertise the Balkan
Report,  Butler  assigned  public  opinion  a  new  role.  For  the  first  time,  a  group  of
influential people believed that it could affect the ruling of international affairs. The
Carnegie report questioned if the massacres of civilians had been committed by armies
representing their governments or by nations to annihilate ethnic groups in the name
of  nationalism.  The  report  denounced  the  behavior  of  all  belligerents :  the
Montenegrins  tried  to  convert  or  kill  Albanians.  The  Greek  and  Serbs  efforts  to
“Hellenize”, “Serbianize” people in Macedonia and the Bulgarian trying the opposite. A
new range of vocabulary appeared :  war of extermination, deportation, campaign of
murders, torture of the war prisoners, violence against women and children, refugee
camps  etc.  The  report  also  denounced  the  Great  Powers  policy,  « these  unhappy
Balkans states have been until now much more the victims of the European decisions
than of their own faults »25, underlining that the Balkans people were never consulted
in the previous international agreements, from Berlin to Mürzsteg. Overall, the report
denounced  the  “secret  diplomacy”  and  advocated  what  would  be  today  termed
“transparency” in politics.
 
B. The Albanian trip of 1921
11 Seven years later, d’Estournelles de Constant reopened the Balkan inquiry to follow up
with the one of 1913. The Carnegie trip to Albania was the final in a series of initiatives
and actions taken by d’Estournelles de Constant to defuse the international crisis over
the  status  of  Albania.  The  international  landscape  was  entirely  different,  as  war
modified not only the geo-political map of Europe but also spirits and minds in foreign
policy.  In  an  innovative  way,  as  soon  as  the  war  ended,  the  Carnegie  Endowment
promoted  international  reconciliation.  Further,  the  CEIP  undertook  a  large
reconstruction program for  universities  and public  libraries26.  It  also  addressed the
issue of rebuilding relationship with Germany and discussed the new political map of
Central and Southeastern Europe at conferences. Soon enough, the Balkans attracted
once more the attention of the CEIP leaders from two angles.  First,  Albania was an
international issue. Born in December 1912, invaded, occupied and partitioned during
the  war,  Albania  appeared barely  as  a  survivor  in  the  post-war  context.  Its  fragile
conditions appealed to the CEIP Balkan Commission.  Second,  the League of Nations
(LN), newly created in 1920 was involved in the intense debate over the international
recognition of Albania. A convergence of interests is to be noticed as the League’s of
Nations French delegation was located in the Carnegie Endowment offices in Paris with
1. 1. 
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Butler’s agreement27.  The CEIP secretary, Jules Prudhommeaux (1864-1948),  was also
the one of the LN’s French delegation presided over by Leon Bourgeois,  a friend of
d’Estournelles  de  Constant  and  Butler.  Finally,  Bourgeois  was  a  member  of  the
consultative committee of the Paris CEIP and was highly appreciated by Elihu Root28.
12 From the Carnegie archives it appears that according to Butler and d’Estournelles de
Constant, the Balkan report of 1913 needed to be completed. Both men viewed it as the
first part of a larger project and/or, they were thinking of another study to follow in an
unknown future29. As soon as the war ended, criticism of the report re-emerged. In May
1919,  Greek representatives at  the Peace Conference approached the Paris  Carnegie
office  asking  to  modify  some  conclusions  of  the  1913  report30.  On  the  Greek  side,
Venizelos, then prime minister, sent a representative — Professor A. M. Andreades — in
the US, where he met Butler31. The Swiss Law Professor Archibald Reiss, known for his
pro-Serb positions, was also contacted separately from the Greeks, and Justin Godart
from the CEIP32. In the end, Butler and d’Estournelles de Constant rejected the Greek-
Serbian request but discussed the possibility of sending a second commission along
with another one, to be sent in Russia to inquire into Bolshevism. However, it appeared
that  the  reconstruction  program  was  a  higher  priority  than  an  investigation  on
massacres that had happened six or seven years previously33.
13 The political  situation in Albania was highly complex.  The country was a  stake for
Greece, Italy and Yugoslavia, which were putting pressure on France and Great Britain
at the Peace Conference to partition the state among the three of them as planned in
the 1915 London Treaty. Following President Wilson’s opposition and a short Albanian
revolt in Vlorë, a port city that was supposed to become Italian, Italy renounced to its
territorial ambitions. However, since the borders with Greece and Yugoslavia remained
undetermined, violent incidents erupted in two contested areas during the summer of
1920 and until 1921. In the north, in the area between Shkodër and Debar (the Drin
Valley),  Yugoslav  troops  entered  into  Albanian  territory  and  raided  villages,  an
allegation denounced by Belgrade according to which the Albanians initiated first a
border  incidents34.  In  the  south,  around Korçë  and Gjirokastër,  the  Greek  minority
complained  about  a  “persecution  campaign”  and  found  echo  and  support  from
Athens35; this was the sensitive question of Northern Epirus versus Southern Albania.
The  Carnegie  archives  contain  detailed  reports  on  the  situation  in  Albania  as
d’Estournelles de Constant received regular news through the Albanian delegation at
the  Peace  Conference,  including  Mehemet  Konitza  (1881-1948),  the  head  of  the
Albanian  delegation,  and  Midhat  Bey  Frashëri  (1880-1949),  later  Albanian
representative at the League of Nations36. In this context, d’Estournelles de Constant
decided to take a double initiative toward the Balkan state he called the “Cinderella of
the Balkans”.
14 First,  at  the end of  the summer 1920,  he wrote to Milenko Vesnić  in  Belgrade and
Venizelos in Athens, both of whom he knew very well37.  In two personal letters, he
denounced the attacks against a nation whose rights to exist were denied, arguing that
he took the cause of Albania in the same way that he had previously defended Serbia
and Greece38. Two days later, he also sent an appeal at the highest level to Lloyd George,
Wilson  and  Balfour,  as  well  as  to  Millerand,  Giolitti,  Paleologue  and  Berthelot,
denouncing what he called « the extermination of the Albanian people »39.  Later, he
followed  up  with  telegrams  sent  to  Hymans,  Bourgeois,  Viviani,  Hanotaux  and
Balfour40. Adopting a cautious attitude, d’Estournelles de Constant did not act in the
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name of the CEIP, but as a politician state-man and an activist of the Peace Movement.
However,  he was obviously known for his official  position as President of  the Paris
Endowment’s office. He shared his initiatives with Butler and reported regularly about
his actions, asking him to keep the CEIP trustees informed as well.
15 On December  17,  1920,  after  two negative  votes,  Albania  became a  member  of  the
League of Nations41. D’Estournelles de Constant attributed this success to his multiple
letters  and unofficial  meetings,  emphasizing the weight  of  his  personal  networking
activity, even describing the officials of the Quai d’Orsay, the French Foreign Affairs
minister,  as  an  elite  of  his  closest  colleagues  which he  had personally  formed and
educated in  the  past42.  In  an emotional  letter  to  Butler,  d’Estournelles  de  Constant
wrote : « I have the honor to announce the birth of a child of whom I am not the father
but  the  godfather »43.Without  minimizing  the  role  of  d’Estournelles  de  Constant  as
president of the CEIP Paris office, one has to put his policy in perspective, as he was not
the only defender of Albania. In London, a strong influential political network led by
Lord Robert Cecil and Aubrey Herbert was equally eager to have Albania joining the
League44.
16 Despite the admission of Albania at the League of Nations, the situation on the ground
did not improve. The territorial integrity and the borders issues remained unsolved as
Greek and Serb-Yugoslavs armed bands continued to maintain a high level of violence.
D’Estournelles de Constant took then a second step. In a letter from March 22, 1921, he
informed Butler that Albanians officials invited him to go to Albania45. Because of his
age, his functions as senator, his known pro-Albanian position and his involvement in
the CEIP reconstruction program, d’Estournelles de Constant declined the invitation
but  decided  to  send  Justin  Godart  to  complete  the  inquiry  process  started  in  the
Balkans in 1913. Justin Godart (1871-1956), a member of the French National Assembly,
is mentioned in the Carnegie archives as member of the advisory council and later as
vice-president of the Paris office. In 1924, after d’Estournelles de Constant’s death, he
was considered as his potential successor at the head of CEIP Paris office. Even if he was
twenty years younger than d’Estournelles de Constant, the two men became extremely
close friends as d’Estournelles de Constant choose him as French representative in 1913
and asked him to go to Albania in 1921. The trip had a double objective : first, to defend
Albania as a viable state and its territorial integrity ; and second, to persuade France,
Great Britain and USA to recognize Albania.
17 The trip was entirely, personally and carefully planed by d’Estournelles de Constant.
Godart left Paris on March 21 and came back on May 24, 1921. What were the main
features of the trip ? Godart was traveling with only one companion, Prothiere, keeping
a low profile and being cautious not to provoke reactions or protest from Yugoslavia
and Greece. D’Estournelles de Constant even decided against advertising the trip in the
press46. Godart went through Rome where he met the Italian foreign minister, Count
Sforza and the French ambassador Camille Barrère. He reached Durrës at the beginning
of April and made two separate trips into Albanian territory. The first one was toward
the north up to Shkodër and went back to Durrës, and the second was toward the south
to Berat, Vlorë, Gjirokastër. From there he made his way back along the Greek and
Yugoslav borders, stopping at Korçë, Ohrid, Elbasan and Tiranë. Along the trip, Godart
was  always  escorted  by  the  Albanian  authorities.  The  travel  conditions  were
occasionally difficult because of the poor shape of the roads. Most of the trip was done
by car but Godart recalled riding horses along the lake of Ohrid on their way to Elbasan.
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Surprised by the heavy rain and the night, the group had to sleep over at the home of a
retired Albanian officer47.
18 Upon his return, Godart wrote a substantial report48. In January 1922, the volume was
published in Paris by the CEIP and the University Press of France (PUF)49. The eleven
chapters  report  covers  three  majors  areas,  the  history  of  Albania  centered  on  the
genuine existence of the Albanian people, the current conditions (political structures,
economy  and  resources)  and  a  political  analysis  of  the  regional  situation  and  the
relations  with  the  neighboring  states  of  Italy,  Greece  and  Yugoslavia.  The  report
reflects the extreme personal vision of Godart and makes a four-point argument. First,
Albania is a victim of the territorial ambitions of its neighbors and the Great Powers’
policy is denounced as vigorously as it was in the 1913 report (chapter 5). Second, the
damages inflicted by the wars are meticulously described and the responsibility for the
borders crisis attributed equally to Greece and Yugoslavia (chapters 7 and 8). Third,
Godart emphasized the reality of the national consciousness (chapter 4) the solidity of
the  Albanian  institutions  recognized  by  all  inhabitants.  He  insisted  on  the  perfect
harmony and peaceful conditions throughout most of the country even referring to
Albania as « the Switzerland of the Balkans ». In fact, the internal political situation
was quite tense and unstable. The two political leaders, Fan Noli and Ahmed Bey Zogu
were  struggling  against  each  other  to  size  power  and  the  institutions  were  barely
functioning. Godart’s one-sided vision of Albania tends to limit the credibility of the
report and of the inquiry supposed to be conducted with impartiality. Finally, Godart is
raising the following major issue, which is probably the core of the report : does an
international  organization  such  as  the  League  of  Nations  have  the  competence  to
decide on the status of a state ? In other words, could the League of Nations rule on
international affairs and decide or impose the international recognition of Albania ?
According to Godart, d’Estournelles de Constant and the CEIP, it could.
 
II. A Comparative Approach : Continuity and Rupture
19 The two reports took place at  two crucial  turning points in European international
affairs. The first looms up at the twilight of the Great Powers’s Empires. The second
appears at the onset of a new area as international affaires were from then on placed




20 The records in the Carnegie archives clearly establish how the report of 1921 continues
the  one  of  1913.  The  link  and  the  filiations  appear  numerous  times  in  the
correspondence between Butler and d’Estournelles de Constant and in the two prefaces
of the reports. « Once the Great War was over, it seemed to me that our report of 1913
ought to be completed », wrote d’Estournelles de Constant in 192150. Despite the war
and seven years, the settlements of the Eastern Question were still of great importance
in foreign affairs. For the Carnegie men, there was a need to reopen the Balkan file as
well as to find a way to address the critics that resurfaced in 1919. As d’Estournelles de
Constant put forward, Albania has been left out from the 1913 inquiry. Justin Godart as
member of the international commission of 1913 and as a sole traveler in 1921 is the
1. 
1. 1. 
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common thread between the reports,  both carried out in the name of the Carnegie
Endowment.
21 The format of the reports is similar : an inquiry, an investigation guided by the concern
to  establish  the  truth  as  seen  on  the  ground.  Despite  the  proliferation  of  articles,
information  reported  by  the  press  appeared  in  1913  and  in  1921  as  fragmentary,
distorted and contradictory. In both cases, to a certain extent, the press initiated the
inquiries. The Balkan wars were amongst the first military conflicts reported on such
high scale by the press, although the process started during the previous ones in the
region, the Crimean War, later the Russian Turkish and the Greek Turkish wars.  In
1921,  the  Albanian  borders  issues  were  not  making  headlines  in  the  press  more
preoccupied by the postwar treaties, but the idea of establishing the truth from one
own eyes appear equally in the two reports. For the Carnegie men, the corollary to the
idea  of  establishing  the  truth  was  that  this  inquiry  was  to  be  conducted  with
impartiality and objectivity. These words were used repeatedly on both sides of the
Atlantic.  Butler defined the inquiry as an impartial  examination by an independent
authority. However, both reports suffered from the same weakness that led to the same
critic. The choice of the participants was highly personal due to the friendly nature
that prevailed in the relationship amongst the CEIP leadership. From the beginning,
Miliukov, recommended by “our friend”Kovaleski, and Brailsford recommended by “his
friend” Hirst, never concealed their openly pro-Bulgarian positions, but obviously their
opinions  limited or  even discredited the content  of  some aspects  of  the  reports  as
Athens and Belgrade used their one-sided opinion to protest51.  In the same way, the
strong anti-Serb and anti-Greek’s features shown by Godart, probably influenced by his
mentor, d’Estournelles de Constant, limit the credibility of his writing and the facts he
reported. However, despite their personal points of view, the inquiry members in 1913
and 1921 made the point not only to gather but also to confront information from all
sides,  allowing  them  to  maintain  a  certain  degree  of  objectivity52.  In  1921,  Godart
blamed equally Athens and Belgrade for their territorial ambitions toward lands he saw
as truly Albanian.
22 The  exhaustive  two  prefaces,  approximately  25  pages  long  and  both  written  by
d’Estournelles  de  Constant,  are  another  common element  of  the  two  reports.  Both
represented his personal touch expressing his point of view written on a vivid tone.
Starting with a strong statement, d’Estournelles de Constant speaks out to the reader as
a witness, an interlocutor, using direct, strong sentences : « I owe a lot to Albania and I
will  pay  back this  debt  of  my youth »  are  the  first  words  in  1921  (original  text  in
French). « War rather than slavery,  arbitration rather than war,  conciliation rather
than arbitration » open the 1913 report. Both texts are conceived following the same
path offering an elaborate  description of  the context  (the Balkans Wars,  history of
Albania) and the reasons for the Carnegie involvement. Then, a summary of the trip
explains the organization, the personalities of its participants and how both reports
were  later  written.  The  vocabulary  is  similar,  using  words  such  as  “truth”,
“impartiality” or “objectivity”53. In both texts, d’Estournelles de Constant put forward
the weaknesses, the obstacles, and the difficulties encountered, as well as the protests
from the Balkans states, the tensions with Belgrade and Athens in 1913 and in 1921. He
was also very aware that no one was going to be pleased by the reports and was ready
to face criticism although he was convinced that ultimately his vision of international
affairs, the need for international law and new rules in warfare would prevail.
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23 The method chosen to conduct both investigations was also similar. It was a scientific
approach or a field approach, the wars and the massacres were viewed as an object of
study.  The  inquiry  members  went  in  the  field  at  a  time  the  events  were  almost
happening. They wanted to ascertain by themselves the facts and record them with
accuracy as in both cases translators were involved (only Miliukov and Brailsford knew
Slavic  languages).  As  Butler  emphasized,  in  a  straightforward sentence,  the inquiry
« represents  the  first  instance  in  history  of  a  study  of  the  results  of  war  by  the
laboratory  method »  and  further  he  also  insisted  on  « the  inductive  method  of
observation »54.  A  range  of  modern  tools  was  used  to  provide  a  systematic  and
analytical recollection of the facts :  statistics, demography, figures as well as photos
taken in action illustrate the will  to be as accurate as possible.  In 1913,  the report
included twenty pages of detailed statistics. Each village, small town visited by Godart
include a meticulous description of the demography, the city budget and an elaborated
list of the prices of the everyday life food and goods along with a conversion in French
Francs.
24 The importance of economy is underlined in both reports. Studying the economy and
its impact on the evolution of the society was one of the main features of the Carnegie
Endowment  from  its  very  origins.  One  of  the  three  divisions  called  Economy  and
History  was  in  fact  entirely  centered  on  the  influence  of  economy  on  historical
developments. The weight of the economy appears in both reports from two angles.
First, the reports assessed the amount of economic damage inflicted by the wars. The
1913 report includes a detailed chapter (chapter 6) written by Samuel Dutton, on the
economic  consequences  of  the  wars  in  terms  of  destruction  of  the  infrastructures
(roads, bridges), the industry (factories) and the agriculture. He also insisted on the
impact  of  the  war  on  the  national  revenues  of  each  Balkan  state  and  how  people
deposits in saving banks went down55.  In 1921, Godart described in details the poor
conditions  of  the cattle  and farmlands.  Moreover,  both reports  provide a  complete
financial analysis, a description in depths of the banking situation, the national debt,
tax system, and the cost of the war (war material, cost of ammunition, equipment of
the army, etc.). The refugees and displaced people are also included in the financial
general statement and not only within regards of their rights in warfare. Second, the
close link between economy and wars made by the CEP leadership is also discussed in
the archives. The first mention of an inquiry appeared in 1912 under the elaborated
temporary title : « A statement as complete and objective as possible on the losses in
terms of men and money caused by the war in the Balkans »56. The II division was then
considered  to  be  put  on  charge  of  the  inquiry.  According  to  the  Carnegie  men,
economic prosperity was perceived as a guarantee of peace, as well-off people would be
less tempted to kill each other.
25 Both reports offer a statement on the necessity for an international organization whose
competence and authority should be above those of any state. In 1913, the chapter 5,
entitled « The war and international law », referred to the two Hague Conferences and
to the constitution of a permanent international commission to regulate the laws of
war. In 1921, the chapter 9 entitled « Albania and the League of Nations » is entirely
focused on the definition of the role of the League of Nations and its possible expansion
in  the  future.  In  both  cases,  the  traditional  Great  Powers’s  policy  in  the  Balkans
(military invasion or zone of influences) is denounced. In 1921, Godart criticized the
conference of the Ambassadors57 on charge of the borders delimitation, as a symbol of
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the continuation of this policy, the pre-war international order, which ignored the real
interests of the Albanian people58.
26 Finally, one theme largely dominates the two reports : what should the features and
meanings of an international intervention be ? Since the 1913 commission was truly an
international one with six nationalities represented, and the 1921 commission included
only French delegates, the following point constitutes a transition between continuity
and rupture between the two reports. Both of them reflect the spirit of the international
mind, a concept elaborated by Butler around 190759. One can draw a line between the
two Carnegie reports and a series of conferences given by Nicholas Butler from 1907 to
1912  and  gathered  in  the  book  The  International  Mind :  an  Argument  for the  Judicial
Settlement of International Disputes (1912). The international mind, as viewed by Butler
and  the  Carnegie  leadership,  born  out  from  the  Peace  movement  and  The  Hague
Conferences, is an attempt to redefine rules and regulations in international policy in
order to transcend nationalism viewed as an outdated stage. For Elihu Root, the CEIP
president,  « the  public  opinion  of  the  world  is  the  true  international  executive
power »60. In both reports, the major actor is public opinion, first in 1913 as the target
of the report, and later in 1921 as an organized institution, the League of Nations. « The
International mind is nothing else than that habit of thinking of foreign relations and
business (…) » and « regard the several nations of the civilized world as friendly and co-
operating equals in aiding the progress of civilization, in developing commerce and
industry,  and  in  spreading  enlightenment  and  culture  throughout  the  world »61.
According to Butler,  public opinion should promote this international mind ;  today,
would  we  call  it  globalization ?  Further  this  public  opinion,  once  informed  and
educated, has the duty to participate in the ruling of public affairs and by doing so
become an active member of the civil society. Both reports illustrate the emergence of
the concept of civil society before and after World War One.
 
B. Rupture
27 As d’Estournelles de Constant wrote several times, the CEIP failed to stop the war, a fact
he resented greatly once the Great War started and in that sense, the 1913 report fell
short of its general objective. In 1921, the CEIP asked the following question : does an
international organization have the competence to give a legal recognized status to a
new state ? Since ultimately Albania was eventually recognized as a state with defined
borders in 1925-26, the 1921 report partly reached its objective.
28 The main differences lay in the circumstances of the two trips. The 1913 trip, at the end
of the Second Balkan War, was viewed by the Carnegie leadership as an answer to a
humanitarian disaster.  The one of 1921 derived from the inadequate settlements or
mismanagements in some decisions taken at the Peace Conference. Clemenceau was
reluctant  to  address  the  Albanian  question  all  together ;  Wilson  and  Lloyd  George
supported the Albanian claims. The issues addressed in the two reports were related as
both dealt with the aftermath conditions of war but their immediate objectives were
different.  The  1913  report  denounced  war  massacres,  atrocities  and  addressed  the
issues of civilian conditions, casualties and rights during warfare. Further, for the first
time,  a  released  document  attempted  to  assign  responsibility  for  the  massacres,
questioning whether the atrocities had been committed by officers, soldiers following
order from their armies or by “armed band” operating semi-independently. In 1921,
the report dealt with the issue of the existence, the viability of a state, Albania, its
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borders and advocated for its international recognition. Finally, the role played by the
civilians was reported differently. One of the main points of the 1913 documents is to
dissociate, to separate the representation of a civilian from the armies during warfare
while the report of 1921 dealt with the civilians as responsible and decisive actor within
the civil society. The Albanians citizens as civilians would have to organize their state
and their national institutions.
29 The scale of publication constitues another difference between the two documents. The
1913 report was launched as a wide international operation conducted simultaneously
on both sides of the Atlantic. Almost 20 000 volumes were edited (13 000 in English and
5 000 in French). In 1921, the Albanian report was limited to a single French publication
on  a  much  lower  scale  of  few  hundred  volumes.  In  the  same  way,  the  publicity,
advertising and the involvement or not of the press were addressed following almost
opposite approaches, and illustration perhaps of the different personalities between
Butler and d’Estournelles de Constant. In 1913, Butler gave several press communiqués
and kept the journalists informed of the progress of the commission whose departure
in train from Paris was released with great publicity. He mobilized all possible means of
publicity to have an impact on public opinion, a strategy he would use again after the
war to advertise the reconstruction program undertaken in Europe with the building of
universities and public libraries in Belgrade, Louvain and Reims62. According to his own
words, « the public opinion of the world is crying out for the light and for leadership in
regard  to  these  dreadful  happenings  in  the  Balkans »63.In  1921,  d’Estournelles  de
Constant  simply  refused  to  involve  the  press  and not  a  word was  published  about
Godart’s trip prior to his departure. From the tone of his letters, he was concerned to
avoid the same strong, aggressive protest from the Balkans officials that had occurred
in 1913. It seems that these critics may have influenced his attitude toward the press in
1920-21.  When  describing  his  initiatives  to  Butler  (lobbying,  writing  to  statesmen/
personalities), he  insisted  on  keeping  the  journalists  away64.  However,  once  Godart
came back and wrote the report, d’Estournelles de Constant organized a large press
release to advertise the Albanian report. The role of public opinion evolved between
the  two  reports.  The  1913  report  is  an  address  to  public  opinion  and  to  the
international audience as such, an appeal to inform and an attempt to educate about
the horrors  of the war.  By 1921,  public  opinion was then organized,  it  had a  legal
recognized frame, that was the League of Nations. As organized institution, the League
of Nations would decide the admission of a possible new comer, Albania.
30 Why did the 1913 report cross over the 20th century and not the one of 1921 ? The
answer lay in the scale of publication already mentioned. In addition, the 1913 report
dealt with almost the entire Balkan Peninsula where Albania represented a limited and
regional stake. Today, the Carnegie report of 1913 is included in numerous books on
Balkan History and/or the Eastern Question. Authors such as Mark Mazower, Maria
Todorova, Ivo Banac or Micha Glenny refer sometimes extensively to the inquiry65. In a
paradox, most of these authors include generally descriptions of massacres that had
been precisely denounced as false by the Balkan governments in 1913 and in 1921 ; and
continue to be, up today, an unsolved issue for several historians of the region. Beyond
the atrocities against civilians and the responsibility aspect, the report of 1913 reached
the 21th century as a reference, an object of study and of debate for its truly innovative
concepts all evolving around the one of how to organize a new kind of international
policy and its rules.
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Conclusion
31 What elements survived the two reports ? The concept of an inquiry was retained and
expanded in the following years66. Almost immediately after the release of the Albanian
report of 1921, Godart took another trip and the CEIP Paris office published another
report entitled Albania in 1922. Actually, this shorter publication included mainly the
report of the international commission sent by the League of Nations in November-
December  1921.  The  concept  of  sending  of  an  international  commission  whose
participants were chosen exclusively from neutral states to guarantee impartiality and
objectivity went one step further, as the one sent in Albania in 1922 was composed of
members  from Finland,  Norway and Luxembourg.  The initiatives  of  1913 and 1921,
taken  by  the  CEIP  as  non-government  organization  were  in  that  sense  innovative.
During  and  after  World  War  One,  several  investigative  commissions  were  sent  to
various areas : a French-Belgium-British one to investigate German massacres, a Greek
one sent to Macedonia, a White-Russian one to document Bolsheviks massacres against
the Orthodox church, and an American one to Ireland67.
32 One has to notice the contrast between the undisputable quality of the inquiries and
the idealism or even naivety in the principles advocated by the Carnegie leadership.
After all, the ultimate objective was nothing less than to defeat militarism and as the
historian  Geoffrey  Best  wrote,  « the  peace  movement  was  swimming  against  the
tide »68. The concepts that education, implementation of international law and cultural
internationalism would prevent further conflict illustrate the high confidence that the
Carnegie men placed in the humankind.
33 Finally, one can ask if the Carnegie reports were only an expression of a humanitarian
concern for civilians in warfare or a reflection of the new US foreign policy in Europe.
The weight of the CEIP as powerful and influential network is to be emphasized. In the
summer 1914 its Balkan Commission was ready to initiate a revision of the Berlin and
Bucharest treaties. In the 1920s the scale of the reconstruction program undertaken in
Central and Southeastern Europe showed that even if the State Department did not
take the starting initiative, American foreign policy was de facto involved despite the
refusal  of  the  Congress  to  ratify  the  Versailles  treaty  and the  US never  joined the
League of Nations. The ambiguous link and sometimes ill-defined relationship between
non-profit  organizations,  such as  the Carnegie  Endowment and the US government
increased further and played a substantial  part in its foreign policy during the 20th
century. In conclusion, the Carnegie Endowment was a pioneer as it participated in re-
defining international affairs, institutionalizing the ideas and concepts elaborated by
and through the pre-war Peace movement.
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NOTES
1. On the origins of  the Peace movement,  see the remarkable work undertaken by Holquist
(Peter), The Russian Empire as a “Civilized State”: International Law as Principle and Practice in Imperial
Russia 1874-1878, Columbia : NCEEER Working Paper, 14/07/2004.
2. In 1899, 26 states were represented. In 1907, the number increased to 44 delegations.
3. The railroad network of the Balkans started in the 1870’s. The Imperial Ottoman Bank (1863)
was a French-British initiative within the modernization of the Ottoman Empire (Tanzimat).
4. Tensions between Christians and Muslims elements in Crete (1896-1899)  and the rise  of  a
national movement (IMRO) in Macedonia (1903) led to the implementation of two programs of
international reforms (police/gendarmerie). The situation in Armenia (1895-1896) also led to a
reform plan but its implementation remained much more limited.
5. Andrew Carnegie (1853-1919), originally from Scotland, made in fortune in the steel industry.
He financed the building of the Court of Arbitration in The Hague (1907).
6. The board of trustees met in New York or Washington. A Year Book was published annually
including the minutes of the meetings.
7. CEIP, Vol. 200, box 520, « Butler to d’Estournelles de Constant, Newport, July 21, 1913 ».
8. The New York Times, July 1-31, 1913, published 31 articles on Balkan Wars, most of them on the
front page. Usually, one long piece followed by 3 to 5 shorter pieces. 
9. CEIP, Vol. 200, box 520, « Carnegie to d’Estournelles de Constant, Skibo, September 18, 1913 ».
From the letter, it seems that Carnegie was surprised to hear about the commission. Also, there is
no indication of how the British newspaper reported about the commission’s features.
10. The military forces have been estimated to one million (700 000 against 300 000 Ottomans).
11. CEIP, Vol. 200, box 520, « Butler to d’Estournelles de Constant August 15, 1913 ».
12. CEIP, Vol. 200, box 520, « Haskell to d’Estournelles de Constant, July 28, 1913 ».
13. Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  Summary  of  Organization  and  Work,
Washington, 1941, pp. 18-30 on the role of the Division of Intercourse and Education.
14. CEIP, Vol. 200, box 520, « d’Estournelles de Constant to Butler, Creans, August 6, 1913 ».
15. Dutton replaced Pr. Prince who despite his knowledge of Balkan languages excused himself
for family reasons. On the French side, Victor Bérard’s refusal led to Godart’s nomination.
16. CEIP, Vol. 200, box 520, « Butler to d’Estournelles de Constant July 31, 1913 ».
17. CEIP, Vol. 121, « Dutton to Butler, Reading Ridge, Conn., July 23, 1913 ».
18. CEIP, Vol. 200, box 520, « Butler to d’Estournelles de Constant, September 22 and 29, 1913 ».
19. Butler and d’Estournelles de Constant discussed the language issue and mentioned that only
Brailsford and Milioukov understood Slavic languages without naming specifically which one.
20. CEIP, Vol. 121, « Dutton to Butler, Sofia, September 20, 1913 ».
21. CEIP, Vol. 201, box 521, « Haskell to Prudhommeaux, December 12, 1913 ».
22. CEIP,  Vol.  201,  box  521,  « Butler  to  d’Estournelles  de  Constant,  December  12,  1913 » ;
« d’Estournelles de Constant to Butler, January 6, 1914 » : « Je suis aussi ennuyé que vous par ce
maudit rapport des Balkans. Milioukov s’est enseveli dans je ne sais quelle solitude de la Finlande
pour terminer son travail ».
23. CEIP, Vol. 200, box 520, « Prudhommeaux to Haskell, Paris, October 17, 1913 ».
24. CEIP, Vol. 202, box 522, « Prudhommeaux to Haskell, Paris, May 12, 1914 ».
25. CEIP, Vol. 189, « Paper d’Estournelles de Constant, August 21, 1913 ».
26. University libraries of Belgrade and Louvain/Leuven and city library of Reims.
27. CEIP CE, box 44, « Butler to d’Estournelles de Constant, January 24, 1919 ». 
28. CEIP, Vol. 141, box 480, « d’Estournelles de Constant to Butler, August 12, 1920 ». On E.Roots’s
visit  to  Paris  and  sharing  ideas  with  Bourgeois.  L.Bourgeois  (1851-1925),  French  state-man,
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numerous times member of the government. Active member of the Peace Movement, French
delegate at the two Hague Conferences, at the Peace Paris conference. Nobel Peace Prize in 1920.
29. CEIP CE, Vol.1, « Draft letter undated, Estournelles de Constant to Butler » : « Le jour où en
1920, la dotation Carnegie décida de compléter l’enquête (…) de reprendre notre oeuvre d’avant
guerre et d’achever notre rapport dans les Balkans » (original in French).
30. CEIP CE, Vol. 190, « Prudhommeaux to d’Estournelles de Constant, May 23, 1919 ». Michel
Kebedgy, international law professor and Alexander Antoniades, engineer, were part of the Greek
delegation at the Peace Conference.
31. Ibid. Venizelos (1864-1936) has been several times prime minister of Greece (2 times in 1915 ;
June 1917-Nov. 1920 ; Jan.-Feb. 1924 ; later in 1928-1932 and 1933) and a member of consultative
committee at the Paris CEIP office. Andreas M. Andreades was sent officially to Washington to
defend the Greek interests in the Balkans.
32. Ibid.  The  report  does  not  mention  if  Reiss  approach  was  made  with  the  Serb  official’s
approval.  Archibald  Reiss  (1875-1929)  is  known  for  his  report  on  Austro-Hungarian  army
atrocities against Serbians during WWI. He was part of the Serbian delegation at the Paris Peace
Conference. 
33. CEIP, Vol. 209, box 529, « Butler to d’Estournelles de Constant, December 22, 1919 ».
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36. Eleonore de Villa, the wife of Nouri Bey, general secretary at the Albanian foreign ministry,
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member of the government Pašić and visited the USA during the war.
38. CEIP  CE,  Vol.  1,  « d’Estournelles  de  Constant  to  Vesnitch,  Creans,  September  8,  1920 » ;
« d’Estournelles de Constant to Venizelos, Creans, September 8, 1920 ». He informed both men
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39. CEIP CE,  Vol.  1,  « d’Estournelles  de Constant  to  Llyod George,  Wilson,  Millerand,  Giolitti,
Balfour,  Paleologue,  Berthelot,  Creans,  September  10,  1920 ».  (Answers  from  Paleologue  on
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43. CEIP, Vol. 141, box 480, « d’Estournelles de Constant to Butler, Paris, December 20, 1920 ».
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51. Maxim Kovalevsky (1851-1916), law professor, recommended Miliukov to d’Estournelles de
Constant. CEIP vol. 200, box 520, d’Estournelles de Constant to Butler, August 1, 1913.
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RÉSUMÉS
Among the significant features of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) was
not only the study of the causes but also of the impacts of the wars on civilian populations. In
1913, the CEIP sent an international commission to the Balkans. The result was the well-known
report of 1914, the first widely circulated description on civilians in warfare. Seven years later,
d’Estournelles  de  Constant,  president  of  the  CEIP  Balkan  Commission,  sent  a  representative,
Justin Godart to study the borders issues of Albania and to report on the crisis with Greece and
Yugoslavia. Godart’s report emphasized the continuity with the one of 1913 and pointed out how
Albania was a key element in the stabilization of the Balkans.
Drawing from the Carnegie archives, the paper offers an innovative reading of CEIP’s initiatives
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in the Balkans before and after World War I within the context of the last chapter of the Eastern
Question.
Although both reports fell short of their objectives as the one of 1914 coincided with the onset of
the war and the fragile  conditions of  the new states post  1918 prevented the success of  the
second one; the principles of stabilization, integration and economic prosperity were visionary as
they are still “on the table” in the Balkans today.
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